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Abstract
In the absence of altruism, there is no obvious reason why a mi-
grant should remit part of his income to his family for investment
at the home location. If the family invests such income (in housing
for example), why would they give it back to the migrant when he
returns? This paper is based on the idea that certain people at a
migrant’s home location may punish those families who do not return
those investments in order to prevent their own possibilities of receiv-
ing future remittances and investments from being adversely aﬀected.
We ﬁnd that in equilibrium we can have remittances to be invested
and given back to the migrant and remittances for private consump-
tion by the migrant’s family even in the complete absence of altruism
on either the part of the migrant or his family.
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11 Introduction
Remittances from migrants to their families are a common occurrence in
rural-to-urban migration and international migration from less developed to
industrialised countries. This paper proposes a new explanation as to why
remittances exist where altruism is absent.
The motives for the migrant to send income home can be classiﬁed ac-
cording to the following three groups:
Purely altruistic. This is the most common explanation for remittances.
Migrants care about the well-being of their family members who remain in
their place of origin ; that is, the well-being of the family enters into the
utility function of the migrant. The migrants will remit to maximize their
own utility taking into account the well-being of their families (LaLonde and
Topel, 1997; Lucas and Stark, 1985).
Another way to look at pure altruism is to consider the whole family as
a single economic agent. Lucas (1997) shows that if the risks in the rural
and urban environments1 are uncorrelated, then the rural family can decide
to send someone to the city to diversify the risk. Anytime one of the parties
(rural or urban) experience negative consequences, remittances take place to
maximize family utility.
Partly altruistic. These are explanations for remittances that depend on
some degree of altruism but have self-interest features.
Andreoni (1989) says that a person may ﬁnd utility in giving a gift (in
this case, remitting) per se, regardless of the well-being of the receiver. That
is, people have a taste for giving and derive utility from it.2 Remittances
are, therefore, caused by altruism as well as by this taste for giving.
Self-enforcing agreements are also used to explain remittances (Lucas and
Stark, 1985; Lucas and Stark, 1988; Stark, 1989). Migrants face most of their
risk in the early stages of migration and their families face a constant risk.3
They insure each other, so that whenever there is a bad crop or the migrant
faces unemployment, the other more stable party sends remittances. Another
way of looking at self-enforcing agreements, is to see the family as a provider
1In many models of remittances, rural-to-urban migration takes place.
2This assumption was ﬁrst made by Becker (1974).
3Again, rural-to-urban migration is assumed to take place.
2of insurance for the migrant in the early stages of migration, when he faces
higher risks; the migrant, therefore, remits as a form of premium payments.
The migrant ﬁnds optimal it to remit even after his risk of unemployment has
passed because he cares about his family (altruism). Another two reasons
that reinforce such an agreement are the aspiration to inherit and the ongoing
risks for the migrant.
When the migrant has some aspiration to inherit, assuming inheritance
is conditional on behavior, the migrant may ﬁnd it optimal to behave nicely
remitting money home. The implication of this approach is that the larger
the potential inheritance, the larger the remittances (Lucas and Stark, 1985).
Altruism from the parents to the migrant is needed, otherwise they would
not bequeath to him.
Stark and Falk (1998) explain remittances as a form of insurance against
future risks. The idea is that the migrant is sending remittances causes the
recipients to develop altruism towards him. Therefore, whenever the migrant
faces unemployment, the recipient of the remittances will provide him with
assistance. If the value of such an insurance is high enough, the migrant will
remit even in the absence of altruism towards his family (or the recipient).
Pure Self-interest. Altruism is not needed in any of these explanations
to obtain remittances as a result. It can, however, reinforce the result.
Lucas and Stark (1985) state that the intention to return home “may be
suﬃce to promote remittance for investment in ﬁxed capital such as land,
livestock, or a house, in public assets to enhance prestige or political inﬂuence,
and in what might be termed social assets—the relationship with family and
friends.”
Lucas and Stark (1985) and LaLonde and Topel (1997) point out that the
migrant may want to invest part of his savings at home, trusting his family
with the investment and maintenance decisions. Altruism from the family to
the migrant “may underlie or enhance such a trust” (Lucas and Stark, 1985).
The main problem of this idea is that there is no obvious reason, apart from
altruism, for the family of the migrant to return the migrant’s investment
to him once he has returned. In this paper we show that altruism from the
family is not necessary for this type of remittance to exist.
The idea is based on peer pressure literature (e.g., Kandel and Lazear,
1992). Not only might be people in the community be willing to punish
families who do not return investments, they might also be willing to be
3punished themselves. This is because, in this way, they can receive more
remittances in the future and beneﬁt more from better investments made by
the migrants.
In section 2, we present a simple model: ﬁrst within the migrant’s family
without social pressure, then with social pressure and ﬁnally with another
families over time. In section 3, we present some empirical implications,
followed in section 4 by conclusions and possible extensions.
2 Model
Let us assume that the migrant can make an investment at the beginning of
the ﬁrst period at home or at the foreign location. At the foreign location,
for each unit invested he will receive r∗ at the beginning of the second period.
At home, he will receive r(> r∗) but he is unable to make the investment
without the help of a parent. His parent makes the investment for him and
receive the returns at the beginning of the second period, at which time the
parent decides how much to give the migrant who is then returning home.
We are assuming that the migrant can invest in a risk-free asset at both
locations with a higher return at home. Since they are risk-free assets, this
assumption may not seem realistic. However, since we are also assuming
that the migrant returns home for the last period, we can think of some
investments that may yield a higher economic value at home. One example
is housing. Since building a house takes time, the migrant might prefer to buy
a house at the time of his return but the supply of housing may be very scarce
especially in small towns. So, the migrant might prefer to send remittances
in order for a house to be built for him. Another example may be investment
in his own business, which can yield a high return if the business has some
market power. Both examples have the characteristic that the migrant has
to return in order to receive the beneﬁts of the investment.4
In the corresponding peer pressure literature there are two sources of
pressure: internal (or guilt), and external (or shame) (Kandel and Lazear,
1992). Altruism can be interpreted as internal pressure since the individual
has some disutility that results from behaving badly towards the other play-
ers, or from making other players worse oﬀ. In this model we will only deal
4We can think of the migrant selling his house or business, but there may be no good
buyers for it in small towns.
4with the external pressure or shame in the form of punishment (or reward)
by the rest of the community.
We assume that wages are w∗ in the foreign location, wm in the home
location for returning migrants (subscript m) and wp in the home location
for their parents (subscript p).
First we look at the decision process within a single family with no social
pressure; we continue by adding social pressure at the family level, and,
ﬁnally, we allow social pressure to come from sources beyond the family.
2.1 No social pressure
Each family consists of one migrant and his parent. The migrant lives the
ﬁrst period at the foreign location earning a wage w∗ and returns to the home
location for the second period in which he will earn a wage wm. We assume
that w∗ > wm and that he returns for reasons exogenous to the model. Since
the migrant’s income is higher in the ﬁrst period, he may save some of his
income in the ﬁrst period to increase his consumption in the second period.
In this model we do not allow the migrant to borrow against future income
because we assume that he migrated in order to get higher income at the
foreign location.5
The parent lives both periods at the home location earning a wage of wp.
We can assume that wp < wm to include the eﬀect of the human capital that
the migrant is likely to have acquired during his stay at the foreign location.
We work without any restrictions on the home wages since it makes no sense
to compare the wages of the migrant and his parent in the absence of altruism.
As stated above, the migrant can invest abroad or at home. Let ρ∗(≥ 0)
be the investment abroad and ρ(≥ 0) be the remittance to be invested, so
the consumption of the migrant in the ﬁrst period is w∗ − ρ∗ − ρ. At the
beginning of the second period the migrant will have r∗ρ∗ and the parent will
have rρ. The parent gives back αrρ to the migrant, where α ∈ [0,1]. That
is, α is the proportion of the investment plus the return at home that the
parent returns to the migrant, keeping the rest. Note that as the parent is
playing the role of a ﬁnancial intermediary, we would normally expect that
the migrant has to pay that service (i.e., α < 1).
5In many international migration cases, the migrants move from a low-wage country
to a high-wage country and borrowing money while they are earning a higher wage makes
little sense if they eventually have to return with a lower income.
5The model assumes that the parent consumes his share of the investment
in the second period. Optimally, the parent would like to consume part of
his share in the ﬁrst period, since wp is the same both periods. One of the
reasons the parent may not keep all the remittance is that, if there are more
periods with the migrant at the foreign location, the parent would want to
behave well by investing in order to receive future remittances. We could
assume that the migrant assigns a payment to the parent for his ﬁnancial
intermediation, which he can spend at any time. We did not assume this
because it makes the model less clear and our results do not depend on this.
So we are assuming that the parent waits until the second period to consume
his share of the investment ((1 − α)rρ).








m is the consumption of a composite good by the migrant in period
i and xi
p is the consumption of the composite good by the parent in period
i. The discount factor is β ∈ [0,1]. Marginal utilities are positive and both
um(·) and up(·) are quasi-concave.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1 At the beginning of the ﬁrst period, the migrant decides the amount to
invest at the foreign location, ρ∗, and the amount to remit home to be
invested, ρ. Both quantities are non-negative.
2 At the beginning of the second period, the migrant returns to the home
location and the parent decides how much of the investment to keep




∗ − ρ) + βum(wm + r
∗ρ
∗ + αrρ) for the migrant and
up(wp) + βup(wp + (1 − α)rρ) for the parent.
The unique subgame perfect equilibrium is given by the backwards in-
duction equilibrium: in the second period, the parent decides to keep all the
investment (α = 0) and, knowing this, the migrant decides to invest only











6In the absence of altruism, even if the migrant is willing to pay part of
the extra return of the investment to the family in order to earn a higher
return, the family has no incentive to return part of the investment to the
migrant when he comes back. Given this, the migrant only invests at the
foreign location. Obviously this outcome is not eﬃcient since investments at
home yield a higher return.
2.2 Social pressure at the family level
Let us assume now that the players can punish or reward each other. To
make the model as simple as possible, each individual has to assign a value
of θ equal to one (reward) or zero (punish) to any other individual. The
average of all θs assigned to an individual is his social acceptance index, Θj
for j = e,p.6 There are still only two players, the migrant and his parent,
and therefore Θj is the θ assigned by the other player to player j = e,p .












m is the consumption of a composite good by the migrant in
period i and xi
p is the consumption of the composite good by the parent
in period i. Likewise, Θi
m is the social acceptance index for the migrant in
period i and Θi
p is the social acceptance index for the parent in period i.
Marginal utilities are positive and both utility functions are quasi-concave as
before.
In the ﬁrst period, there is no punishment for either player, since the
players are in diﬀerent locations (i.e., Θ1
m = Θ1
p = 1). In the second period
players can reward or punish the other player. We allow for a revision of the
players θs when a player rewards a player who punished him. This seems
reasonable since whenever a player ﬁnds out that he is being punished by
another player, he is likely to punish back. The timing of the game is as
follows:
1 At the beginning of the ﬁrst period, the migrant decides the amount to
invest at the foreign location, ρ∗, and the amount to remit home to be
invested, ρ. Both quantities are non-negative.
6We use the average because this way Θ is in [0,1] for any number of players in the
game.
72a At the beginning of the second period, the migrant returns to the home
location and the parent decides how much of the investment to keep
((1 − α)rρ) and how much to return to the migrant (αrρ).
2b Having seen α, they simultaneously assign each other θ.
2c If one of the players decides to punish the other one while the other
rewards him, the punished one can change his decision and punish in
return.
The payoﬀs are given by the utility functions:
um(w
∗ − ρ
∗ − ρ,1) + βum(wm + r
∗ρ
∗ + αrρ,θpm) for the migrant and
up(wp,1) + βup(wp + (1 − α)rρ,θmp) for the parent,
where θij is the social acceptance given by player i to player j.
Let the strategy of any player in [2c] be that if they are punished, then
they punish back. This means that is θij = 0 then θji = 0 also. It does
make sense that if one is punished by another member of the community,
the natural thing to do is punish to him back. We continue to make this
assumption throughout the rest of the paper.
To ﬁnd the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game, we have to look at
the subgame starting in [2b]. Given the above assumption, for any value of








There are two Nash equilibria in this game (Reward, Reward) and (Pun-
ish, Punish). However, (Punish, Punish) is not a trembling-hand perfect
equilibrium7 and we can eliminate it as a likely equilibrium. Note that the
strategy Punish is weakly dominated for both players and both players would
be better oﬀ with the (Reward, Reward) equilibrium.
7This basically means that if we allow a small probability of the players making a
mistake in their actions, then they would not play that equilibrium. See deﬁnition 8.F.1
on page 258 of Mas-Colell et al., 1995.
8Given that the only robust equilibrium of the subgame starting in [2b]
is (θep = 1,θpe = 1). Then, as in section 2.1, the only subgame perfect








So the equilibrium of this game will be again that the migrant does not
send remittances because the parent would keep them if he does and every
player rewards the other player.
2.3 Social pressure at the community level
We have found that, in the absence of altruism, we cannot ﬁnd a robust
equilibrium in which the migrant will send remittances for investment. We
now introduce new families over time. To avoid problems of coordination, we
are shall have only two families coexisting in each period. The composition
of each family and the timing within the family are the same as in section
2.2.
Each family (except for the very ﬁrst one) has to coexist with two other
families: in the ﬁrst period for the family (while the migrant is abroad),
they have to coexist with a family made up of the returning migrant and
his parent. For the second period (when the migrant has returned), they
have to coexist with a younger family made up of the migrant abroad and
his parent. That is, in each period there are going to be four players: A
returning migrant and his parent, and a migrant abroad and his parent. A
family that has played for two periods disappears and it is replaced by a new
family.
The game is played ad inﬁnitum by an inﬁnite number of families. If we
number the families by the ﬁrst period they play (family n is the family whose
migrant is at the foreign location in period n), we will add a subscript n to
our notation. For example, for migrant n, consumption in his ﬁrst period in
the game (that is, when the migrant is abroad) is x1
en. Also migrant n (or
Mn) is the migrant of the nth family and parent n (or Pn) is the parent of
the nth family.
Utility functions are given equation (2), where Θi is the average of the
social acceptances (θs) given to the player i.
8That survives trembling-hand perfection.
9As before, when at the foreign location, the migrant has Θ = 1 since
there is no reason (nor way) to punish him, and he does not reward or
punish anyone.
Using n = 2,3,4,5,... we can describe the timing of the game as follows:
1 At the beginning of ﬁrst period, there is only one family. M1 decides the
amount to invest at the foreign location, ρ∗
1, and the amount to remit
home to be invested, ρ1. Both quantities are non-negative.
n a At the beginning of each period, Mn−1 returns to the home location and
Pn−1 decides how much of the investment to keep ((1 − αn−1)rρn−1)
and how much to return to the migrant (αn−1rρn−1).
n b Having seen αn−1, Mn−1 and Pn−1 simultaneously assign θs.
n c Having seen all actions up to [n b], Pn assigns θs.
n d If one of the players decides to punish another while the other rewards
him, the punished one can change his decision and punish in return.
n e Having seen all θs awarded, Mn has to decide the amount to invest at
the foreign location, ρ∗
n, and the amount to remit home to be invested,
ρn. Again, both quantities are non-negative.9









mn ) for Mn and
up(wp,Θ
n
pn) + βup(wp + (1 − αn)rρn,Θ
(n+1)
pn ) for Pn.
A subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is, as before, no punishments,
no remittances, αn = 0∀n and ρ∗
n satisfying equation (3).
There are, however, incentives for the parent of the migrant who is abroad
(Pn at time n) to punish the parent of the returning migrant (Pn−1) if they
keep too much of the investment (low value of αn+1). This is because the
parent of the migrant abroad wants the migrant to remit as much as possible.
To ﬁnd a subgame perfect equilibrium in which the migrant abroad sends
a positive remittance, we ﬁrst propose the strategies that each player has
9Even though time [n d] is after all other decisions are made, we assume times [n a] to
[n d] are fast and [n e] takes place at the beginning of the nth period.
10to follow and then proceed to ﬁnd the conditions necessary for the subgame
perfect equilibrium to exist. All the equilibrium we are going to look at are
symmetric in the sense that all migrants choose the same strategy and all
parents choose the same strategy also.
We begin with the case in which migrants do not invest any amount at
the foreign location; i.e., ρ∗
n = 0∀n.
Using again n = 2,3,4,5,..., the proposed strategies are as follows:
M1 Sends ρo to his parent at the beginning of the ﬁrst period for it to be
invested at home. At time [2b], if α1 ≥ αo, then rewards his parent,
otherwise punishes his parent. He also rewards P2. At time [2d], if
a player punished him while he rewarded that player in [2b], then he
punishes back.
Mn He sends ρo at the beginning of the nth period to his parent for it to be
invested at home (at time [n e]) unless three things happen together:
1. αn−1 < αo,
2. Pn didn’t punished Pn−1, and
3. either Pn didn’t punish Mn−1 or Mn−1 didn’t punish Pn−1.
At time [(n+1) b], if αn ≥ αo, then he rewards his parent, otherwise he
punishes his parent. Rewards Pn+1. At time [(n+1) d], if a player pun-
ished him while he rewarded that player in [(n+1) b], then he punishes
back.
P1 At time [2a], chooses α1 = αo. At time [2b], he rewards everyone. At
time [2d], he punishes back anyone who punished him at [2b].
Pn At time [n c], if αn−1 < αo, then he punishes Pn−1, otherwise he rewards
Pn−1. If he punished Pn−1 and Mn−1 didn’t punish his own parent in
[n b], then he punishes Mn−1 also, otherwise he rewards Pn−1. At time
[(n+1) a], he chooses α1 = αo. At time [(n+1) b], he rewards everyone.
At time [(n+1) d] he punishes back anyone who punished him at [(n+1)
b].
First we check if the strategy of P1 is consistent. P1 will set α1 = αo only
if:
up(wp + (1 − α
o)rρ
o,1) ≥ up(wp + rρ
o,0). (4)
11Since the strategies of the other players are to punish him if α1 < αo, then
he would have to be punished if he deviates from his strategy. It is clear that
if he deviates, then he will return nothing to M1. Note that if inequality (4)
is satisﬁed, the rest of his strategy is consistent.
If the strategy of P1 is consistent, that means that if everyone follows
their strategy, P1 will not deviate from his own, and will choose α1 = αo.




Note that he is willing to punish his parent (and punished by his parent in
return) because otherwise he will be punished by P2 and he is indiﬀerent
towards both punishments. Inequality (4) is less likely to hold for larger
values of ρo. This means that if the migrant wants to invest a large enough
quantity in the ﬁrst period, he will ﬁnd it optimal to invest also at the foreign
location. The migrant determines ρo based on the ﬁrst order conditions of
his maximization problem and the restriction he has in (4).
The rest of the parents (Pn for n = 2,3,4,5,...) have to be willing to
punish any parent that wants to deviate by keeping all the investment. Given
the other strategies, Pn is willing to punish Pn−1 if:
up(wp,1/2) + βup(wp + (1 − α
o)rρ
o,1) ≥ up(wp,1) + βup(wp,1). (6)
That is, if (6) is satisﬁed, then the parent is better oﬀ punishing (and being
punished by) Pn−1 today and receive part of the investments tomorrow, than
not being punished but receiving zero remittances. We also need that the
parents not to want to keep all the investment. It is clear that the parent
is better oﬀ if he does not have to punish another parent, in which case he
will be in the same situation as the P1. So, if P1 does not want to deviate
and if Pn is willing to punish the deviant parent, then P 0
ns strategy is also
consistent.
Finally, we have to check if Mn’s strategy is consistent. If he knows that
Pn is not willing to deviate, then he can play his strategy even in the case
of Pn−1 having deviated, unless Pn−1 was not punished. If the rest of the
players’ strategies are consistent then Mn’s strategy is also consistent.
Note that ρo is determined by the migrants and αo by the parents, with
the restriction that relations (4) to (6) hold. A high value of ρo makes relation
(4) less likely to hold but relation (6) more likely to hold, this means that
the values that ρo can take are bounded. The same happens with αo, since
12relationships (4) and (6) are less likely to hold for a large αo but relationship
(5) is more likely to hold.
The migrants can invest more than relationships (4) to (6) allow, but it
will have to be at the foreign location. So, it is possible for us to observe
remittances for investment and savings at the foreign location. In that case,
the outcome of the game is not eﬃcient. If the migrants only invest at home,
then the outcome is eﬃcient since they are investing where the returns are
higher and there are no punishments.
These strategies form a subgame perfect equilibrium if relations (4) to
(6) hold. In that case, the outcome we will see is as follows:
• Migrants remit to their parents for investment and for parent’s con-
sumption.
• There are no punishments in equilibrium and the parents give back
most of the investment to the returning migrant.
• If the wage diﬀerential between both locations is large enough, then
the migrant may ﬁnd it optimal to invest in both locations.
• Better investment opportunities (larger r), will result in larger remit-
tances but not always in more investment.10 This is because (1 − αo),
the proportion kept by the parent, can increase when investments at
the home location are better.
3 Empirical implications
This model has a number of empirical implications. The ﬁrst is that, even
in the absence of altruism, we might observe remittances for investment but
also remittances for the families to spend on whatever they wish.
The model is also consistent with seeing returning migrants who sent
remittances for investment and go back with savings.
This model ﬁts best in communities where ties with the rest of the commu-
nity are important. We might expect the model to apply better to smaller
communities where losing friendships might be worse than in larger com-
munities where people may create new relationships more easily. Also, the
importance of the extended family might be important for larger remittances.
10As we mentioned above, we are assuming that the parent also invests his share, but
he could also consume it in the ﬁrst period.
13Note that all the empirical implications of the model can also be inter-
preted as the presence of altruism, even though they are the result of a model
without it.
This model’s results depend on the return of the migrant. One possible
implication of the model is that the results are more likely to appear in
situations where there is a high probability of return migration. Hence we
could conclude that our results are more likely in international migration
than in internal migration, or in illegal migration than legal migration.
4 Conclusions and possible extensions
We have shown that, even if no altruism is present, it is possible that re-
mittances for investment and for consumption by the family of the migrant
can be seen in equilibrium. This, of course, does not rule out altruism which
would make it easier for remittances of this type to be seen but shows that
it is not necessary in all cases for the family to display altruism towards the
migrant.
The main assumption in the model is that people in a town can put
pressure on other people in the town in order to obtain some beneﬁts. Our
results show that, in the absence of altruism, we can have a game in which
we observe people behaving as if they where altruistic in equilibrium.
There are some possible extensions for this paper. One is to look at how
social pressure in the foreign communities can aﬀect remittances and return
migration. Another is to model how peer pressure can aﬀect the migrant’s
behaviour to possibly make him send remittances for present consumption
even in the absence of altruism.
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